

**Annexe 77. Échanges de câbles et de documents divers entre le représentant spécial du
secrétaire général des Nations unies et le général Roméo Dallaire avec les responsables
du département des opérations de maintien de la paix à New York
(Annan-Goulding-Hansen) du 9 au 24 avril 1994**

77.1 La stratégie du FPR selon le général Roméo Dallaire.....	2
77.2 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 9 avril 1994.....	3
77.3 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 16 avril 1994.....	9
77.4 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 18 avril 1994.....	10
77.5 Télégramme de l'ambassadeur du Rwanda en Ouganda au président de la République à Murambi du 21 avril 1994 et autres documents sur les négociations.....	14
77.6 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 21 avril 1994 sur la réduction des effectifs de la Minuar.....	19
77.7 Échanges Dallaire/Annan du 24 avril 1994 sur la rencontre Dallaire/Kagame du 23 avril 1994.....	23
77.8 Communiqué du FPR du 23 avril 1994.....	28
77.9 Le refus des interventions humanitaires par le FPR.....	30
77.9.1 Extrait de Human Rights Watch/Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, <i>Aucun témoin ne doit survivre. Le génocide au Rwanda</i> , Karthala, 1999, p. 816.....	30
77.9.2 Entretien entre le général Roméo Dallaire et Paul Kagame, Mulindi, le 19 avril 1994 ¹	30

¹ Roméo Dallaire, *J'ai serré la main du diable*, Libre Expression, Montréal, 2004, p. 412-413.

77.1 La stratégie du FPR selon le général Roméo Dallaire (audition Dallaire, procès Bagosora *et alii*, TPIR, 21 janvier 2004, p. 4.)

« Lorsque je me suis engagé sur la voie du processus de paix vers la fin de la guerre, en juin, juillet et août, et vu les comportements du FPR depuis le mois de janvier, en particulier sur le terrain, et en raison des pressions qui ont... exercé en usant de divers instruments, par exemple les réfugiés. Mais il y a également l'intransigeance politique que manifestait le FPR en matière de coopération ou de dialogue par opposition à la confrontation... Vers fin juin, en juillet et en août, au moment où la guerre prenait corps, j'ai pu m'apercevoir que, de plus en plus, le FPR voulait prendre le contrôle de l'ensemble du pays et ne s'orientait pas nécessairement vers un gouvernement équilibré sur le plan ethnique, mais plutôt vers un retour massif des réfugiés de la diaspora, par opposition aux Tutsis de l'intérieur qui avaient survécu.

J'ai donc compris que le FPR n'avait pas nécessairement, parmi ses priorités, le bien-être des populations de l'intérieur mais, plutôt, un plan longuement élaboré qui aboutirait à un pays dominé par les Tutsis. »

77.2 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 9 avril 1994

194 APR -9 21 29

10004279

CRN-107

1/4

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 INFO: KITTANI
 FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 DATE: 9 APRIL 1994
 NUMBER: MIR-727
 SUBJECT: CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA
 REFERENCE:

CASE NO. 10004279
 EXHIBIT NO. 376
 DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
 TENDERED BY PROSECUTION
 NAME OF WITNESS BOOH BOOH

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REMAINED VERY TENSE WITH HEAVY FIRING THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND LIGHT FIRING MOST OF THE NIGHT. IT SEEMED THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE RPF WAS THE AREA OF THE KANOMBE AIRPORT (KIGALI AIRPORT) AND CAMP KANOMBE
2. RGF AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNITS ARE STILL CONDUCTING LOOTING AND KILLING IN THE AREAS THEY CONTROL. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THEY TARGET UN VEHICLES. RPA HAS THE VICINITY OF THEIR COMPLEX OF THE CMD UNDER CONTROL AND THEY ARE HELPING CIVILIANS FIND SHELTER WITH UNAMIR FORCES PRIMARILY AT THE STADIUM ANOHORO. APPROXIMATELY 1000 PERSONS ARE UNDER OUR CARE. NO WATER, FOOD OR SANITATION FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR THESE PEOPLE.
3. GENDARMES, RGF AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ELEMENTS ARE ONLY MONITORING THE ACTIONS OF THE INTERHAMWE MILITIA (PARTY MILITIA OF THE MRND) AS THEY COMMIT ATROCITIES. IN SOME AREAS OF KIGALI INTERHAMWE HAVE CONTROL (NIAMIRAMBO BILYOGO AND KINASAGARA).
4. AT DIFFERENT ROAD BLOCKS UNAMIR INFORMATION OFFICER WAS TOLD BY RGF, GENDARMES, INTERHAMWE AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD THAT THEY WILL GIVE TROUBLE ONLY TO THE BELGIANS. THEY HAVE COMMENCED ASKING THE NATIONALITY OF UN PERSONNEL AT ROAD BLOCKS. IN MANY CASES GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND MILITIA ARE DRUNK OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS.
5. UNMOs REPORT KILLINGS AND LOOTING BY MRND SUPPORTERS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE GENDARMERIE IN BUGARAMA, KIBUYE, AND CYANGUGU OUTSIDE KIGALI. THE CONFLICT APPEARS TO BE SPREADING TO OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.
6. AT GISERNYI, ONE UN AUSTRIAN MAJOR WAS THREATENED, HIS MONEY WAS

CRN-107 2/4

10004280

STOLEN (\$8000) AND HIS RADIO WAS SEIZED.

7. IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, SOME KILLINGS AND LOOTING WAS REPORTED. ABOUT 350 PERSONS HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN A CATHOLIC CHURCH.

8. IN KIGALI, IT IS STILL VERY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF DEAD. AS MANY AS THOUSANDS MAY HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES. THIS CANNOT BE VERIFIED IN OUR PRESENT SITUATION BUT THE KILLINGS ARE CONTINUING IN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREAS. THE VICTIMS ARE MOSTLY TUTSIS OR HUTUS FROM THE SOUTH OR FROM NON-MRND /CDR POLITICAL PARTIES.

9. TWO MILOB'S FROM URUGUAY WERE INJURED AT AMOHORO STADIUM (RUTBAT AND REFUGEE LOCATION NEAR UNAMIR FORCE HQ) DUE TO SHRAPNEL FRAGMENTS FROM A MORTAR BOMB. IN TOTAL 4 MORTAR BOMBS HAVE FALLEN ON THIS LOCATION IN THE LAST 12 HOURS. BOTH CASUALTIES WERE TREATED AND ARE IN STABLE CONDITION.

10. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT SOME MOBS ARE ATTACKING ISOLATED BELGIAN FAMILIES. IT IS ALLEGED ONE BELGIAN WOMAN AND HER CHILD HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED AT KICKIRU AREA OF KIGALI. DUE TO FIGHTING AND ROADBLOCKS UNAMIR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT.

11. STATEMENT. DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM THE MILITARY CRISIS COMMITTEE OF ENDORSING THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND RESTRAINT OF THEIR FORCES, THE RPF, GENDARMERIE AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAVE NOT RETURNED TO THEIR BARRACKS. IF NOT ACTUALLY CONDUCTING THE TERROR CAMPAIGN THEY ARE THEY ARE AT A MINIMUM ASSISTING, OBSERVING AND NOT TAKING ANY ACTION TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. INTERCHANGE AND OTHER MOBS ARE CONTINUING THEIR CAMPAIGN OF ETHNIC AND GENERAL VIOLENCE. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES CONTINUE TO MOUNT AND POSSIBLY MEMBERS EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY, OR AT LEAST PORTIONS OF IT, ARE THREATENED IF NOT BEING ATTACKED OUTRIGHT. UNAMIR IS STILL LARGELY CONFINED TO IT'S CAMPS DUE TO FIGHTING BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND CANNOT VERIFY OR EVEN OFFER PROTECTION TO ANYONE IN MOST AREAS OF THE CITY. THE CONFLICT APPEARS TO BE COMMENCING IN OTHER (PRIMARILY NORTH WEST AND SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY) AREAS. DESPITE ASSURANCES TO RESTRAINT THEIR FORCES THE MILITARY CRISIS COMMITTEE EITHER CANNOT CANNOT CONTROL LARGE PORTIONS OF THEIR FORCES OR ARE IMPLICATED IN THE TERROR CAMPAIGN.

12. DESPITE REQUESTS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND THE FORMATION OF A NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH RPF MEMBERSHIP (BUT NOT MEMBERSHIP FROM OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES AS THEY HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR ARE IN HIDING) THIS GROUP IS NOT MATCHING ITS WORDS WITH DEEDS. RPF HAS DENOUNCED THE GROUP AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT AS PUPPETS AND UNACCEPTABLE.

13. RPF ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSE OF THE MILITARY CRISIS COMMITTEE AND CONSIDERS THEMSELVES (IN STATEMENTS TO FC UNAMIR) TO BE IN A STATE OF WAR WITH GOVERNMENT FORCES. DNE SECTOR REPORTS MOVEMENT OF RPF TROOPS IN THE NORTH EASTERN SECTOR AND THEY APPEAR TO BE PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. RPF HAS STATED THEY ARE FED UP WITH THE KILLINGS AND CONSTANT MANIPULATIONS OF THE PAST.

CXN-104 3/4

10004281

14. IN NEGOTIATION WITH FC UNAMIR THE RPF HAVE REJECTED A DEAL WITH THE MILITARY CRISIS COMMITTEE, GOVERNMENT FORCES OR WITH A NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE RPF IS EXPECTED TO LAUNCH A MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE TOWARDS KIGALI WITHIN HOURS. THE RPF STATE THEY HAVE NO QUARREL WITH UNAMIR OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR ITS DEPENDENTS IN RWANDA AND WILL NOT ATTACK THESE GROUPS. THEY WILL ASSIST IN ANY WAY THEY CAN WITH AN EVACUATION. THEY REQUEST UNAMIR OR FOREIGN FORCES NOT INTERFERE WITH THEIR OPERATIONS AND THEY IN TURN WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH A UNAMIR AND GENERAL EVACUATION.

15. UNAMIR HAS ONLY SEVERAL DAYS OF BASIC SUPPLIES WITH LITTLE HOPE OF OBTAINING MORE FROM THE LOCAL AREA DURING THE PRESENT SITUATION. MOST UNITS HAVE BASIC (WATER, RATIONS, FUEL) NEEDS DUE TO RESUPPLY EFFORTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7/8 APRIL. UNAMIR IS STILL LARGELY CONFINED TO ITS BASE CAMPS BY THE FIGHTING. UNAMIR IN ITS PRESENT STATE AND WITH ITS PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION CANNOT PROTECT ALL OF THE EXPATRIATE OR CIVILIAN COMMUNITY WITHIN RWANDA AND CANNOT CONDUCT AN EVACUATION WITH ITS PRESENT RESOURCES. UNAMIR WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO ASSIST LOCAL CIVILIANS, EMBASSIES, UN AND OTHER NGOs AND EXPATRIATES BUT OUR EFFORTS ARE MINIMAL AND WE CANNOT SUPPORT (IE WATER AND FOOD) THESE PERSONS.

16. FC UNAMIR SPENT MOST OF DAY AND NIGHT 7/8 APRIL SHUTTLING BETWEEN MILITARY CRISIS COMMITTEE AND THE RPF ATTEMPTING TO GET A CEASEFIRE FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS. HIS VEHICLE FREQUENTLY FIRED UPON BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. ALL NEGOTIATIONS TO NO RESULT. CONFLICT CONTINUES WILL LITTLE HOPE FOR CEASEFIRE OR CONTINUATION OF PEACE PROCESS.

17. AT 0400 HOURS IT WAS REPORTED BY UNAMIR FORCES AT THE AIRPORT THAT FRENCH TROOPS HAD LANDED AT THE AIRPORT. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE MISSION OF THIS FORCE. RPF HAS CONFIRMED LANDING OF FRENCH AND STATE THEY HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH IT. RPF RECOMMENDS THEY EVACUATE THEIR NATIONALS AND NOT USE MAIN ROAD IN FRONT OF CND FOR TRANSIT. FC ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT SRSG AND AMBASSADORS OF US, FRANCE AND BELGIUM TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION.

18. AT 0600 HOURS DMZ SECTOR REPORTED HEAVY MG AND MORTAR FIRING IN AREA OF EAST DMZ AIMED AT AKAGIRA HIGHWAY. RPF SECTOR CONFIRMED RPF SOLDIERS IN THIS AREA WERE ON THE MOVE AND COULD NO LONGER GUARANTEE SECURITY OF UNMOs. UNMOs WILL REMAIN IN LOCATIONS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE FLOW OF INFORMATION. IF DANGER APPROACHES THEY HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO FALL BACK ON MULINDI OR GO NORTH TO UNOMUR BORDER CHECKPOINTS. AT 0730 REPORT RECEIVED FROM DMZ STATED HEAVY FIRING IN BYUMBA AREA AND WEST OF BYUMBA. THIS CONFIRMS UNAMIR ASSESSMENT THAT AXIS OF BYUMBA TO KIGALI AND WEST OF BYUMBA TO BASE TO KIGALI. AT 0745 DMZ REPORTED RPF TROOPS IN LAST TWO MENTIONED AXIS WERE ON THE MOVE.

19. CONCLUSION. THE CONFLICT CONTINUES AND IS EXPECTED TO ESCALATE SHORTLY DUE TO REFUSAL OF RPF TO ACCEPT PROPOSED

10004282

14

GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLY DUE TO THE ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AT THE AIRPORT. MASSACRES DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE ABATED AND MAY BE ENTERING A NEW PHASE AS THE FIRST TWO PERSONS (WOMEN OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY) WERE KILLED AND MOLESTED. UNAMIR FORCES BLOCKED BY FIGHTING AND NATURE AND CAPABILITY (IE ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS) OF OUR FORCE FROM INFLUENCING THE SITUATION. FORCE CANNOT CONDUCT EVACUATION ALONE SHOULD THAT BE ORDERED. DURING THE LAST 48 HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS, MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS ALL WITHIN AN ATMOSPHERE OF OPEN HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE FORCES IN KIGALI AND A LARGE NUMBER OF KILLINGS AND ABDUCTIONS OF OFFICIALS, CHANCES OF PEACE PROCESS CONTINUING OR EVEN ESTABLISHING CEASE-FIRE IS UNLIKELY. EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY, UN AND OTHER AGENCIES IF THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT IN RWANDA CONTINUE TO HAVE NO REGARD FOR PEACE PROCESS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION THEN UNAMIR MUST ALSO BE EVACUATED. WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL WITHIN OUR POWER AND ABILITY TO PROTECT UN AND OTHER AGENCIES, EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY AND CIVILIANS BUT OUR RESOURCES ARE INADEQUATE AND SITUATION WILL RAPIDLY DETERIORATE SHORTLY.

20. RECOMMENDATIONS/OPTIONS. INTENSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SRSG AND POLITICAL STAFF AND FC AND MILITARY STAFF CONCLUDE PRESENT MANDATE OF THIS MISSION CANNOT BE CONDUCTED DUE TO REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE. THERE IS NO PEACE TO KEEP. THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS ARE PRESENTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, DECISION AND ACTION:

- A. UNAMIR COULD REMAIN IN PLACE BUT MUST BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED AS CRITICAL SUPPLIES ARE DOWN TO 1-3 DAYS SUPPLY. IF THIS OPTION IS TAKEN WHAT WOULD BE OUR MANDATE AS OUR PRESENT MANDATE CANNOT BE CONDUCTED? IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THIS FORCE WAS CONFIGURED AND EQUIPPED FOR PEACEKEEPING NOT PEACE ENFORCEMENT.
- B. UNAMIR ASSIST IN EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. FOR THIS OPTION TO BE SUCCESSFUL UNAMIR MUST BE REINFORCED WITH AT LEAST TWO TO THREE BATTALIONS TO SECURE AIRPORT, FORCE ROADBLOCKS, ESCORT CONVOYS ETC. THIS WILL REQUIRE A NEW MANDATE ESPECIALLY ON THE USE OF FORCE. WHEN THIS IS COMPLETED AND IF UNAMIR IS ORDERED TO EVACUATE, OUR INTENTION REQUIRING YOUR SUPPORT IS TO WITHDRAW RPF SECTOR UNMOs TO UGANDA. WITHDRAW ONE INFANTRY BATTALION AND ENGINEER COMPANY TO UGANDA. THIS ELEMENT DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT LIFT TO MOVE IN ONE GROUP. A SHUTTLE WOULD BE ORGANIZED AND CONTROLLED BY UNAMIR. RPF AND SOUTHERN SECTOR UNMOs WOULD WITHDRAW TO NEAREST NEIGHBOURING NATION. KIGALI SECTOR WOULD WITHDRAW FROM KANOMBE (KIGALI) AIRPORT.
- C. FIRST TWO OPTIONS ASSUME UNAMIR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF EVACUATION. IF A LARGER UN OR OTHER EVACUATION IS PLANNED UNAMIR CAN PROVIDE SUPPORT WITH ITS IN PLACE FORCES (IE TRANSPORT, FORMED UNITS, COMMUNICATION, CONTACTS, LIAISON, EXISTING EVACUATION PLAN FOR UN AGENCIES ETC).

21. REMARKS

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISIONINTER OFFICE MEMORANDUMCONFIDENTIAL3000.9 (IO)
15 April 94TO : FC
THROUGH : COO
: DFC
FROM : MIOCASE NO. IC-98-41-T
EXHIBIT NO. DNT 183
DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
TENDERED BY DEFENSE
NAME OF WITNESS B.004 B.004SUBJECT : COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. RPA : It is taking advantage on the ground. They are slowly, calmly and cooley gaining terrain. At this moment, they are manning to cut off the main routes. Many important targets are surrounded: Camp Kacyuru- Urugwiro village - Meridien Hotel. They are ready to engage RGF of Presidential Guard Camp in Kimihurura.

RPA is also installing TUTSIS in areas already under its control; its also helping them for vital supply.

RPA is conducting massive but very concealed infiltrations in KIGALI. It has assumed that about 10 battalions are already in the city. In fact, I witnessed hundreds of them getting in CND building the 14 April 94 around 2130; a very long column carrying mostly machine guns, anti tank weapons (RPG 7) etc.

Also this morning an important column has left MULINDI.

Routes for supply have been found by RPF and are under their control.

First aid medicines are critically needed.

RPA main HQ is still in MULINDI but the exact location of the tactical mobile HQ is unknown.

It also seem that RPA had begun infiltrations before the current hostilities since special rescue operations are still conducted in RGF/INTERAHAMWES controlled zone such as NIAMIRAMBO area.

RPA troops are not conducting looting unless necessary in order to feed their supporters or themselves. They are not intended to spoil public goods or edifices.

The general intention seems that they are conducting a deep penetration to control the main RGF supply routes , to

surround the main targets and to make assaults only once they are ready.

Taking control of the airport is not their interest and they are avoiding to cross UNAMIR.

2. RGF It seems that the flow of tactical information is not working well to reach their own troops who are on contacts lines. Most of the time they don't know that RPA is close to them.

Some of them are leaving the fighting areas but no surrounding to RPF reported.

Most of the troops are supplying themselves by looting. The general feeling is that they are fed up of the ongoing situation and would be happy about a cease fire. They are confident in UNAMIR and specially confident in some Nationalities but not in BELGIANS.

The lack of coordination is noticed among RGF; number of hard liners is decreasing. The acting OPS leaders are favorable to peace process.

There is a divorce between the acting governmental military command and the INTERAHAMWES. In Niamirambo area, the Presidential Militia has the entire control. The Interahamwe political wing is very active. Even governmental Forces have to show ID and can proceed only after having been given clearance. The milicians are very excited and the road sides are full of dead bodies at the road blocks. They are armed with grenades and traditional weapons. I was obliged to turn back after four road blocks because they were getting very excited and seemed to be under influence.

3. It seemed that ITALIANS conducted special tasks against RPA (In fact it's a special force detachment). The whole detachment has left after FC's request.

77.3 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 16 avril 1994

184

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

TO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ANNAN/GOULDING

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

SUBJECT: Ceasefire- Rwanda conflict

DATE: 16 APRIL 1994

194 APR 16 21 54
194 APR 16 22 20

CASE NO. ICR-98-4-1
EXHIBIT NO. DNT 184
DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
TENDERED BY DEFENCE
NAME OF WITNESS BOOH BOOH

MIR-777

1. My telecommunication facilities have been disrupted by recent developments in Kigali. Hence, my inability to reach the Secretary-General by phone as he has requested. Please transmit the following note to him.
2. On 15 April 1994, I convened a meeting between the RPF and the RGF to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. The atmosphere in the meeting was cordial but RPF presented a set of conditions to be fulfilled before participating in discussions for a ceasefire. (Document in French containing Preconditions attached). RGF agreed to study the document and react to it at the next meeting the following day.
3. On 16 April 1994, I urged both parties to be flexible and to prioritise their demands since some conditions could best be implemented by the Broad-Based Transitional Institutions. RPF called to state that a follow-up meeting will be futile if RGF did not stop the massacres. RGF informed me that a meeting was being convened on the situation in Rwanda today in Kampala by President Museveni and that the RPF and the RGF will be represented by the First Vice President of RPF and the Rwanda Ambassador in Uganda, respectively. Consequently, RGF suggested we await the outcome of that meeting before both sides meet again. Meanwhile, the RGF issued the attached statement which appears to be its response to the preconditions of the RPF.
4. At 20.00 hours local time, the national Radio of Rwanda announced a new group of military leaders, including a new Chief of Staff appointed by the self-proclaimed interim government. The new group of military leaders did not include the leaders earlier appointed by the "Crisis Committee". We have not determined the tendencies of this new group. Their initial statement is however conciliatory. General Dallaire is scheduled to meet with General Kagame of the RPF tomorrow and will raise the question of the ceasefire and the worsening humanitarian situation. We also plan to meet the new military leaders of the RGF. Thereafter, we will undertake a thorough appraisal of the overall situation and inform you accordingly.
5. Regards.

77.4 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 18 avril 1994

CASE NO. ICR-98-41-T
 EXHIBIT NO. DNI 185
 DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
 TENDERED BY DEFEH CE
 NAME OF WITNESS Booh-Booh
UNAMIR

19 APR 18 19 94
 UNAMIR FORCE HQ
 OUTGOING FACSIMILE

18 APR 13 P 4 28
 75

KYF 678

KMF 454

18 APRIL 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: J.-R. BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, DPKO, NEW YORK	<i>[Signature]</i>
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 84265
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	
UNOMUR : FAX (256) 486-23186 DMZ SECTOR : FAX 64168 SEC KIGALI (3 x) MILOB GP HQ UNCIVPOL	
SUBJECT: SPECIAL SITREP 180800B APR TO 181900B APR 94.	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER:	

DIRECT

MIR 785

MISC-339

1. THE FIRST HALF OF THE DAY WAS RATHER CALM. SMALL ARMS FIRING OCCURRED. LATER ON THE HOSTILITY AMONGST RGF AND RPF BETWEEN CND AND MERIDIEN STARTED AGAIN. FEW MORTAR SHELL LANDED BETWEEN HOTEL CHEZ LANDO AND FORCE HQ.
2. EFFORTS ARE BEEN MADE BY UNAMIR TO BRING PEACE BETWEEN RGF AND RPF. THE LIFE IN THE CAPITAL CITY IS STILL AT STAND STILL. NEGOTIATIONS ON CBASE FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RGF AND RPF MEDIATION BY UNAMIR STILL GOING ON WITH OUT ANY FRUITFUL RESULT YET. EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES IS STILL ONGOING. PEOPLE ARE STILL COMING TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS AND ASK FOR UNAMIR ESCORT.
3. THE RWANDESE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS BELIEVED TO BE INSTALLED IN GITARAMA. THEY HOWEVER YET TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY.
4. APPROXIMATE 4000 REFUGEES LOCATED AT AMAHORO STADIUM AND ABOUT 10000 REFUGEES HAVE TAKEN SHELTER AT KING FAISAL HOSPITAL INCLUDING 140 SOS CHILDREN. THE REFUGEES ARE FACING ACUTE SHORTAGE OF FOOD, WATER, MEDICINE AND ACCOMMODATION. WATER SUPPLY AT AMAHORO STADIUM AND KING FAISAL HOSPITAL IS NOT AVAILABLE. HEALTH AND HYGIENIC CONDITION IS DETORIATING.

3/5

SL NR	DTG	MESSAGE
1	180545	Cross firing between RPF and RGF started from morning 0530 hrs.
2	180600	One mortar shell has landed in the stadium near to a standing APC.
3	180610	Info all sect comd, bn comd and independent coy comd that they will attend the conf of FC at 0800 hrs.
4	180758	3 x chinese stranded in a house in between CND and Hotel Chez lando, need evac.
5	180800	UNAMIR wants to send a team of technicians to RWANDA tel exch for estb tel line.
6	180830	About 60 RGF soldiers have taken position west of R/W between AA gun, in the NW and AA Gun in the south. No commander of them around to ask about their intention.
7	180830	Clearance for BYUBAT convoy moving to airport has been given and also for the Red Cross convoy which will move at 0900 hrs has been given.
8	180830	Convoy of BYUBAT has started moving for airport.
9	180840	COS of RGF agrees to meet the journalists. He wants to know the name of the agencies.
10	180843	The convoy of BYUBAT was stopped by RGF at the br and then round about. Clearance given and convoy is on going.
11	180910	Escort for journalist at 1000 hrs from Meridien cfm with CO.
12	180915	Reference RGF's requests to evacuate 800 school students from BYUMBA, RPF can not ensure safe passage for them.
13	180917	RPF agrees on the point of evacuation by Red Cross and they also propose that next time Red Cross should evacuate the supporters of RPF from Hotel Milles Collines to CND.
14	180920	RPF permits the movement of the technician to Rwanda Tel.

4/5

15	180920	RPF DO not agree on the point of landing taking over of the airport by RGF. Because they think that they are being left. They want a meeting with the FC immediately.
16	180945	The RPF did not except to allow the RGF officers to pass through their def line to attend the scheduled meeting at 1015 in the airport. FC meet RPF. They said UNAMIR has to take over the airport first and wants a draft of plan.
17	181000	Log Coy with all of its belongings reached Amahoro Stadium safely.
19	181029	3 x Chinese expatriates at present at Amahoro stadium want to go to Chinese Embassy. 5 Switzerland expatriates in the Swiss embassy close to Belgian Embassy require help.
20	181030	KIBAT Hel Det unit has VHF AM set which can be used as attn means of comm between aircraft and tower. FC to request KIGALI Sec Comd to handover one or two of this set to UNAMIR to set up our VHF AM comm if agreed for 4 x Sig offtr will liaison with hel det unit to receive those sets.
21	181035	RPF has given clearance to pass the convoy of 19 veh to go to KINIHIRA to bring the Ghana Bn from there. RGF has given clearance at 1110 hrs and the convoy moved at 1130 hrs.
22	181120	The meeting stated at the airport with the rep of RGF ref.
23	181215	Only 1 trip has been made to the airport. After that all tpts (22) have been sent to KINIHIRA. The convoy to KINIHIRA is on its way to KINIHIRA.
24	181230	1. Mr. Douglas of Uganda and Mrs. Olga of Russia have take shelter at Fd Hosp. Requested their evac to KIA. Husband of Mrs. Olga being a Rwandese also wants to be expatriated. 2. 142 children from SOS village have taken refugee to the Fd Hosp. They have no food. Requested on arrangement for their food.
25	181325	1 RGF hel has taken off at 1318. likely to land at camp Kigali.

5/5

26	181455	RGF is increasing their str at the western area of the run way. Actual str is 3 pl. Initial str was 1 Section.
27	181530	Completed move from stadium to KIA.
28	181548	1. Veh carrying medicine from the KIA to Pd Hosp while crossing the round about near Meridien. 4 boxes of medicine fell down from the veh. When they tried to collect the boxes, a few shots were fired direction not confirmed. They could collect 1 box, leaving 3 boxes on the spot. 2. RPF tps with weapon have visited the Pd Hosp incl the OT.
29	181610	Convoy arrived at Kinihira at 1610 hrs.
30	181615	Convoy moving from airport to bring BYUBAT GOLF personnel.
31	181615	3 x pick up are going from KIA to BYUBAT GOLF please ask clearance from both side.
32	181700	21 aspirates has start from RUTBAT to KIA airport with escort. Various nationality.
33	181750	RGF is firing Mor from camp KANUMBAY.

77.5 Télégramme de l'ambassadeur du Rwanda en Ouganda au président de la République à Murambi du 21 avril 1994 et autres documents sur les négociations

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



AMBASSADE RWANDAISE
EN OUGANDA

P. O. Box 2468, Kampala
Tél: 41103, Telex 61277

Kampala, le 21/04/1994

N°

7/1
L000258C

N/Réf. N°
V/Réf. N°
Objet:

TELEGRAMME OFFICIEL

DESTINATAIRE : MINAFFET

INFO : PRESTREP - PREMIER MINISTRE - MINADEP

TEXTE

N° 140/04.02.A13/V1.1 REFERENCE MON TELEGRAMME N° 138/04.02.A13/V1.1 DE CE MATIN, HONNEUR VOUS INFORMER QUE LES PARTICIPANTS A LA REUNION DU 20/04/94 SE SONT ENCORE RENCONTRES CET APRES-MIDI POUR APPROUVER LE DOCUMENT EN 5 POINTS QUI POURRA SERVIR DE BASE AUX NEGOCIATIONS D'ARUSHA LE 23/04/94.

QUELQUES AMENDEMENTS ONT ETE FAITS SUR LES POINTS 1, 3 ET 4, LE PLUS IMPORTANT ETANT AU POINT 5 OU IL EST PROPOSE QUE L'OUA ET LES PAYS DE LA REGION EXAMINERONT COMMENT ILS PEUVENT CONTRIBUER A LA VERIFICATION DU CESSEZ-LE-FEU ET DE L'ARRET EFFECTIF DES MASSACRES, EN PLUS DE LA MINUAR.

LE DOCUMENT AMENDE QUI EST EN ANNEXE EST A EXAMINER PAR CHAQUE PARTIE (GOVERNEMENT RWANDAIS ET FPR) ET UNE NOUVELLE RENCONTRE POUR ECOUTER LES REACTIONS DE CHAQUE PARTIE EST PREVUE POUR SAMEDI A 0900, SOUS LA PRESIDENCE DU PRESIDENT MUSEVENI TCI A KAMPALA.

PRIERE DONC NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOS REACTIONS SUR CE DOCUMENT AU COURANT DE LA JOURNEE DU 22/04/94. TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

KANYARUKHOKI CLAVER

AMBASSADEUR



21 '94 19:13

0000 RWANDA EMBASSY NAIROBI

TEL 254-2-336365

10002581

P. 4

21/04/94 19:01

256 41 290547

2-BRWANDA K.L.R

P.03

8/9

ORIGINAL

1. THE GOR & RPF WILL MAKE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS COMMUNICATING EACH OTHER TO ENTER INTO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THAT WOULD GO INTO FORCE 24 HOURS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. (AT HRS RWANDA TIME TIME GMT).
2. FROM THE START OF THE CEASEFIRE, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE 96 HOURS TO CONTROL THE VIOLENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF CONTROL;
3. UNAMIR WOULD BE ASKED TO VERIFY BOTH THE CEASEFIRE AND WHETHER THE KILLINGS HAD IN FACT STOPPED;
4. IF SO, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE COMMITTED TO MOVE TO IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS;
5. AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE KILLINGS AND MASSACRES BEFORE AND AFTER THE LATE PRESIDENT HANYAMANA'S DEATH, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS OWN DEATH.



21/04/94 1 46

256 41 238347

AMBASSADE K'LB

P.02

ANNEXE AU TELEGRAMME N° 140/04.02.AIS/VT.1

9/9

DOCUMENT ANNEXE SOUMIS A CHAQUE PARTIE POUR EXAMEN ET REACTION

10002582

1. LES DEUX PARTIES FERONT DES DECLARATIONS PUBLIQUES (ANNONCEMENTS) SIMULTANÉES ENGAGEANT CHAQUE PARTIE A AVOIR UN CESSER-LE-FEU IMMÉDIAT QUI ENTRERA EN VIGUEUR 24 HEURES APRES LA DECLARATION (A TELLE HEURE HEURE DU RWANDA, I.E. TELLE HEURE GMT).

2. A PARTIR DE L'ENTREE EN VIGUEUR DU CESSER-LE-FEU, LES 2 PARTIES DISPOSERONT DE 96 HEURES POUR MAITRISER LA VIOLENCE DANS LES ZONES RESPECTIVES QU'ELLES CONTROLENT.

3. LA MINUAR SERA PRIEE DE VERIFIER TANT LE CESSER-LE-FEU QUE L'ARRET EFFECTIF DES MASSACRES. L'OUA ET LES PAYS DE LA REGION EXAMINERONT COMMENT ILS POURRONT CONTRIBUER A CETTE VERIFICATION.

4. DES QUE LE PARAGRAPHE DEUX CI-DESSUS SERA REALISE, LES DEUX PARTIES S'ENGAGENT A ENTAMER IMMEDIATEMENT LES DISCUSSIONS SUR UNE RAPIDE MISE EN OEUVRE DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA.

5. UNE COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE SERA CREEE POUR ENQUETER SUR LES TUERIES ET LES MASSACRES QUI ONT EU LIEU AVANT ET APRES LE DECES DU PRESDENI HABYARIMANA, AINSI QUE LES CIRCONSTANCES DE SA PROPRE MORT.

KAMPALA, 21/04/1994



RÉPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
ARMÉE RWANDAISE
ÉTAT-MAJOR

G3

10002578

5/9

NZ.JB/

PS/3

KIGALI, le 21 AVR. 1994

N° 0654 G3.3.0

Son Excellence le Dr Jacques Roger BOOH BOOH
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général
des Nations Unies au RWANDA
KIGALI

Excellence Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint
le message du Gouvernement Rwandais à l'Ambassadeur de la République
Rwandaise à KAMPALA en vous priant de bien vouloir le faire parvenir
à son destinataire.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le
Représentant Spécial, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

BIZIMUNGU Augustin
Général-Major
Chef EM AR

0/9 92/3

TELEGRAMME OFFICIEL

L0002579

DE : Monsieur le Premier Ministre
du Gouvernement Rwandais.

A : Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de la
République Rwandaise
à KAMPALA.

TEXTE

Honneur me référer à votre télégramme officiel du 19 Avril 1994 pour
vous communiquer la réponse du Gouvernement sur la proposition de
cessez-le-feu.

1. Le principe de cessez-le-feu est accepté;
2. L'Accord de Paix d'ARUSHA doit être sauvegardé et mis en oeuvre.

Les détails seront discutés lors de la rencontre prévue le 23 Avril 1994
en Tanzanie entre le Gouvernement Rwandais et le Front Patriotique
Rwandais sous les auspices du Facilitateur.

Fait à KIGALI, le 21 Avril 1994

Pour le Gouvernement Rwandais

Jean KAMBANDA

Premier Ministre



77.6 Échanges Booh-Booh/Annan-Goulding-Hansen du 21 avril 1994 sur la réduction des effectifs de la Minuar

D.M. 188
10002574

CASE NO. UN-98-41-T
EXHIBIT NO. DNT 186
DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
TENDERED BY D. EFENCE
NAME OF WITNESS Booh Booh CRN-136 1/49

UNAMIR

93 APR 21 23 12

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI *[Signature]*

DATE: 21 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-811 11M APR 21 P 1:34

SUBJECT: URGENT REQUIREMENT TO REDUCE UNAMIR TO A RESIDUAL FORCE BY LAST LIGHT FRIDAY 22 APRIL 1994

REFERENCE: TELCON ANNABI\DALLAIRE DATED 21 APRIL 1994

1. POLITICAL ASSESSMENT. A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION HAS BEEN THE CONTINUING EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT MUSSEVENI TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES. AS A RESULT OF EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HE HAS HAD WITH THE PARTIES HE HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH HE WOULD SUBMIT TO THE ARUSHA MEETING FOR FINAL CONSIDERATION BY THE PARTIES. THE AGREEMENT PRESENTS FIVE PROPOSALS TO THE PARTIES WHICH, IF ACCEPTED WILL ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE TO GO INTO EFFECT 24 HOURS LATER.
- B. A PERIOD OF 96 HOURS IN WHICH THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO CONTROL VIOLENCE IN THEIR AREA.
- C. UNAMIR WOULD BE ASKED TO VERIFY THAT BOTH THE CEASEFIRE AND THE KILLINGS HAD STOPPED.
- D. BOTH SIDES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENTER INTO IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.
- E. AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE FORMED TO INVESTIGATE THE KILLINGS AND MASSACRES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE COUNTRY BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE LATE PRESIDENTS DEATH, INCLUDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEATH.

2. IF THESE POINTS ARE ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES, THE BASIS OF A VERIFIABLE CEASEFIRE, THE HALTING OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS MAY BE ADVANCED. A MAJOR REQUIREMENT FOR THIS PROCESS TO SUCCEED WILL BE A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE UNAMIR

PRESENCE IN RWANDA. A RESIDUAL FORCE MUST THEREFORE BE LEFT IN-COUNTRY IN ORDER TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THE POSSIBLE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION TASKS WHICH THIS AGREEMENT COULD REQUIRE. THIS DEMAND COUPLED WITH THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WILL NECESSITATE BOTH UN OBSERVERS AND FORMED TROOPS TO A REASONABLE LEVEL. THUS THE THINNING OUT OF UNAMIR ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO THESE IMMEDIATE TASKS CAN BE CONDUCTED AS LONG THE RESIDUAL FORCE INITIALLY DOES NOT GO BELOW THE 500 MAN LEVEL UNTIL THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASEFIRE IS LOST IN PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS OR CONTINUED FIGHTING. A REVIEW OF THIS MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL MUST BE CONDUCTED POST-ARUSHA DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO REDUCE WHERE NECESSARY THE BURDEN OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL COSTS IN THE WAR ZONE.

3. DURING THE REFERENCE THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO COMMENCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MAIN BODY OF UNAMIR WAS DISCUSSED. IT IS IMPERATIVE AND AN URGENT SAFETY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENT THAT UNAMIR BE DOWNSIZED FROM APPROXIMATELY 1500 PERSONNEL TO 600 BY LAST LIGHT ON 22 APRIL 1994.

4. THREAT. THE RPF AT THE PRESENT TIME APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN BYUMBA IN THE NORTH (ALONG THE MAJOR ROUTE TO UGANDA) AND ARE ADVANCING SOUTHWARD TOWARD KIGALI AGAINST DETERMINED RGF RESISTANCE. THEY HAVE TAKEN RAWAGAMA IN THE EAST (THUS CUTTING THE ROAD TO TANZANIA) AND ARE ADVANCING TO THE WEST UPON KIGALI. IN ADDITION, THEY CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE MEN AND MATERIAL INTO KIGALI AT NIGHT AND ARE SLOWLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY EXPANDING THEIR AREA OF CONTROL BY STRANGLING RGF FORCES INTO THEIR CAMPS, SEIZING KEY TERRAIN FEATURES (IE MT KIGALI) AND BY SEIZING OR DOMINATING KEY CROSSROADS. THE BLITZKREIG NATURE OF THEIR OFFENSIVE AS WAS SEEN IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR, HAS SLOWED AND HAS BEEN METHODICAL IN ITS APPLICATION WITH THE FOCUS OF THEIR MAIN EFFORT THE STRANGLING AND CAPTURE KIGALI. WITHIN 48 TO 72 HOURS, IF THEY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT RATE OF ADVANCE, THE FORCES FROM THE EAST WILL LINKUP WITH THEIR FORCES IN THE CITY AND THEY WILL BE FIGHTING FOR CONTROL OF THE CITY, AND MOST ESPECIALLY THE PRIZE OF KIGALI, THE AIRPORT.

5. REPORTS HAVE REACHED UNAMIR THAT THE RGF IS MOVING REINFORCEMENTS FROM RUHENGERI (NORTH WEST) AND GITARAMA (SOUTH) TO KIGALI. THE RGF IS STRENGTHENING THEIR POSITIONS NEAR THE AIRPORT AND HAS EVEN TAKEN TO BLOCKING THE RUNWAY AT NIGHT; AN ACT UNAMIR HAS PROTESTED AS IT ENDANGERS OUR CASUALTY EVACUATION CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE RGF HAS REJECTED THE AGREEMENT ON MAKING THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AN INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL AREA UNDER THE SOLE CONTROL AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR. THEY INSIST ON JOINT CONTROL AND SECURITY; A STATE THE RPF WILL NEVER ACCEPT. EVEN THE CIVILIAN DIRECTOR OF THE AIRPORT VOICES THE SAME POSITION THAT HIS STAFF WILL WORK FOR THE RGF. THE RGF ARE IN FACT SQUEEZING UNAMIR INTO A POSITION TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT WITH THEM AGAINST THE RPF; A POSITION UNAMIR CANNOT ACCEPT. THEREFORE A MAJOR CONFRONTATION IS COMING AT THE AIRPORT, WITHIN THE NEXT 48-72 HOURS GIVEN THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE

RGF AND ITS POLICY DIRECTION OF CONTROLLING THE AIRPORT.

6. WITH THE CONVERGENCE OF FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES FROM ALL DIRECTIONS ON KIGALI, A MAJOR BATTLE FOR KIGALI COULD BE IMMINENT. THIS BATTLE MAY ALSO INVOLVE OPERATIONS TO CONTROL THE AIRPORT. UNAMIR WILL THUS BE CONFRONTED WITH TWO OPTIONS: EITHER TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT OR TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AIRPORT TO "SAFE AREAS" WITHIN THE CITY AND AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE FOR KIGALI.

7. UNAMIR CANNOT DEFEND THE AIRPORT WITH ITS PRESENT WEAPONS OR AMMUNITION STOCKS FROM A DETERMINED ATTACK BY EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES. UNAMIR WAS EQUIPPED FOR PEACEKEEPING AND EVEN GIVEN THE LIMITED BELGIAN EQUIPMENT THAT WAS TURNED OVER TO UNAMIR, HEAVY WEAPONS LIKE MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN THE MISSION IN THE NUMBERS NOR IN THE AMMUNITION HOLDINGS REQUIRED TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT FROM A DETERMINED ATTACK.

8. WITHDRAWING TO SAFE AREAS AND ALLOWING THE BATTLE FOR THE AIRPORT TO REACH ITS OUTCOME IS THE OPTION THAT IS PREFERABLE. HOWEVER, GIVEN OUR PRESENT STRENGTH OF 1600 MEN, OUR SUSTAINMENT OF THAT SIZE OF FORCE, ONCE OUR LIFELINE (THE AIRPORT) IS CUT OFF, WILL BE VERY LIMITED (10 DAYS MAXIMUM WITH NO ROAD WITHDRAWAL POSSIBLE AFTER 8 DAYS). IT WILL ALSO PLACE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE LOSING SIDE OF A POTENTIAL BLACKMAIL POSITION WITH THE RESUPPLY OF UNAMIR AS A BARGAINING CHIP. IN ADDITION, THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD OF BATTLE, NO AIRLIFTED HUMANITARIAN AID WILL ARRIVE IN KIGALI. THE 14000 REFUGEES THAT HAVE SHELTERED THEMSELVES AROUND UNAMIR LOCATIONS WILL PRESENT A MORAL, HUMAN, HEALTH AND HYGIENE CATASTROPHE FOR THE REFUGEES AND FOR UNAMIR. THEREFORE, WHILE WITHDRAWING TO SAFE AREAS IS THE PREFERABLE OPTION TO DEFENDING THE AIRPORT, IT CANNOT BE CONDUCTED AT OUR PRESENT STRENGTH.

9. FOR THE PAST 48 HOURS UNAMIR HAS BEEN STARTING AND STOPPING NO LESS THAN THREE TIMES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MAIN BODY TO NAIROBI. AT PRESENT 116 GHANIAN SOLDIERS ARE LIVING IN INTERNMENT CAMP CONDITIONS AWAITING THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO HOME COUNTRY OR REDEPLOY TO KIGALI. IN ADDITION OVER 1000 MEN IN THE FORCE HAVE BEEN CONFUSED BY THE DAILY AND SEMI-DAILY CHANGES TO THE DIRECTION THEY WILL TAKE (PULL OUT OR DIG YOUR TRENCHES DEEPER). RUMOURS ARE RAMPANT AS CAN BE EXPECTED IN THIS SITUATION OF FREQUENT CHANGES. IN VISITS TO THE SOLDIERS OF EACH OF THE MAJOR UNITS TODAY THE FC FOUND THE TROOPS TO BE EXHAUSTED, CONFUSED, CONCERNED AND QUESTIONING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THEIR SUPERIORS AS TO WHAT THEY ARE DOING. CONTINUAL DELAYS AND CHANGES IN DIRECTION WILL ONLY SERVE TO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MORALE AND MOTIVATION OF THE SOLDIERS OF THIS MISSION WHO ARE ALREADY UNDER COMBAT RELATED CONDITIONS.

10. THE CONTINUAL DELAYS AND CHANGES IN DIRECTION HAVE ALSO LED TO SUPPORT PROBLEMS SPECIFICALLY IN AIRCRAFT TO SAFELY AND SECURELY MOVE THE PERSONNEL TO NAIROBI. ONE UN AIRCRAFT HAS

4/49

LOST ITS INSURANCE AND THE OTHER AIRCRAFT MAY LOSE ITS INSURANCE TONITE. GIVEN ONLY THE PRESENCE AND SUPPORT OF TWO CANADIAN FORCES HERCULES, THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR FORCES CANNOT BE CONDUCTED OVER THE NEXT 48 TO 72 HOURS. EVERY HOUR OF DELAY IN THINNING OUT LEADS TO AN HOUR CLOSER TO THE CLOSING OF THE AIRPORT AND THE ISOLATION OF A LARGE PORTION OF UNAMIR.

11. WITH MAJOR FIGHTING BEING CONDUCTED ALONG THE KIGALI-UGANDA AND KIGALI-TANZANIA ROADS, AS WELL AS IN KIGALI, A ROAD WITHDRAWAL WILL BE A DANGEROUS AND RISKY OPERATION WHICH WILL ENDANGER THE LIVES OF THE MEN OF UNAMIR AND MAY NOT SUCCEED IN EXTRACTING THE MISSION.

12. IF UNAMIR CAN BE REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY BEFORE LAST LIGHT ON 22 APRIL (IE LESS THAN 600 MEN REMAINING) THE MISSION, GIVEN ITS PRESENT STOCKS FOR 2500 PERSONNEL, WILL BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN ITSELF IN SAFE AREAS FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH IF THE AIRPORT WERE CLOSED.

13. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE AIR WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR COMMENCE AT FIRST LIGHT ON 22 APRIL UNTIL LAST LIGHT THAT DAY. IT IS EXPECTED, IF THE AIRPLANES ARE AVAILABLE, UNAMIR CAN BE REDUCED BY APPROXIMATELY 1000 MEN AND WILL BE IN A POSITION, IN AN EARLY STAGE OF THE BATTLE FOR KIGALI TO ISOLATE AND SUSTAIN ITSELF. IT MAY BE CATASTROPHIC TO DELAY ANY LONGER IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT UNAMIR COMMENCE ITS SCALED WITHDRAWAL AT FIRST LIGHT ON 22 APRIL 1994.

14. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT THE TROOPS EXITING THE THEATER BE KEPT IN NAIROBI FOR ONE WEEK BEFORE FINAL REPATRIATION TO THEIR COUNTRIES, TO ALLOW THEIR IMMEDIATE REDEPLOYMENT IN RWANDA SHOULD A CEASEFIRE BE AGREED UPON IN ARUSHA.

15. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SOONER.

16. REGARDS.

77.7 Échanges Dallaire/Annan du 24 avril 1994 sur la rencontre Dallaire/Kagame du 23 avril 1994

CASE NO. TEP-98-51-1
EXHIBIT NO. DNT 187
DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2000
TENDERED BY DEFENCE
NAME OF WITNESS DECH 2004

UNAMIR
194 APR 24 21 34
UNAMIR
OUTGOING CODE CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE
TO: ANNAN (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 24 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: mir 829
SUBJECT: CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA
REFERENCE: A. DPKO CODE CABLE 1233 DATED 21 APRIL 1994
B. DPKO CODE CABLE 1237 DATED 21 APRIL 1994

1. THIS ASSESSMENT OF MEETINGS AND OBSERVATIONS COLLECTED OVER THE LAST 36 HOURS. DURING THIS TIME FRAME THE FC MET WITH THE RGF CHIEF OF STAFF, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND TWO OF HIS MINISTERS, THE COMMANDER OF RPF FORCES (MGEN KAGAME), AND THE RPF MINISTER PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU. THE USG HA, MR PETER HANSEN, ALSO VISITED WITH US.

2. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. MGEN KAGAME MADE IT QUITE CLEAR IN MY 2 1/2 HOUR MEETING WITH HIM THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE REFUGEES IN KIGALI HAS STALLED AND SLOWED DOWN HIS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CAPITAL. HIS Pincer MOVEMENT FROM THREE DIRECTIONS, WHILE DOMINATING MOST OF THE HIGH GROUND AROUND THE CITY, IS READY TO BE IMPLEMENTED. IT LOOKS AS IF HE IS GOING TO HIT KIGALI LIKE HE DID BYUMBA. BY DAY THERE WILL BE ARTILLERY/MORTAR BOMBARDMENT ON VERY SPECIFICALLY SENSITIVE TARGETS IN THE CITY AND AT NIGHT THERE WILL BE SMALL UNIT INFILTRATION \HARASSMENT; ALL THIS AIMED AT KEEPING THE RGF ON EDGE, SLEEPLESS, DEMORALIZED AND UNDER THE PRESSURE OF BEING SURROUNDED. HE HAS JUST SENT ME A NOTE TO MOVE ALL MY ELEMENTS TO MY MAIN LOCATIONS (AMAHORO AND AIRPORT). SHOULD I DO THIS THE MILLE COLLINES WILL BE DEFENSELESS EXCEPT FOR GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND I WILL HAVE NO MORE CONTACT WITH THE RGF ARMY HQ.

3. RPF HAVE DEMANDED TO MOVE REFUGEES OUT OF THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND THE AMAHORO STADIUM TONIGHT. WE TRIED TO MOVE THEM TODAY BUT RGF ARTILLERY HIT THE REFUGEE EVACUATION ROUTE AND RGF HIGH COMMAND WILL NOT AGREE TO MOVE UNTIL IT HAS WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM THEIR GOVERNMENT, WHICH THEY SHOULD GET AS A RESULT OF FC MEETING WITH THE PM YESTERDAY. WE HAVE THUS ACKNOWLEDGED THE ESSENTIAL NEED TO MOVE KING FAISEL TONIGHT

L00017.

- 2 -

ALONG A SECURE RPF ROUTE AND PROCEED NORTH THROUGH BYUMBA. IF I GET TRANSPORT FOR THEM IN THE MORNING WE WILL EASE THE BURDEN OF THIS MOVE. WE PLAN TO MOVE THE MERIDIEN PEOPLE TOMORROW SOMETIME. THE MILLE COLLINES SITUATION WILL STILL BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM UNTIL THE RGF GIVE THEIR FULL SUPPORT. LAST NIGHT THE FC DEPLOYED TWO APCs AND 15 SOLDIERS WITH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT RESPONDING TO PROTECTION OF A UN INSTALLATION. FC DOING SAME TONIGHT.

4. THE HA ADVANCE PARTY IS HERE AND ASSESSING THE SITUATION. IMMEDIATELY, A PLANNED MEETING WITH THE ICRC (THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL NGO IN RWANDA) WAS CANCELLED DUE TO ARTILLERY FIRE ALONG THE ROUTE. THEY CONTINUE TO STUDY THE SITUATION UNDER AN UMBRELLA OF URGENCY. THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES IN KIGALI, LET ALONE THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS IN RWANDA, ARE IN DESPERATE NEED OF WATER, FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SANITATION AND SHELTER. MOST HAVE HAD LITTLE OF THE ABOVE BARE MINIMUM SURVIVAL NECESSITIES SINCE THE WAR STARTED. 2 CANADIAN FORCES HERCULES HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FC BY CANADA TO SUPPORT UNAMIR IN ANY WAY HE DETERMINES. THE PRIORITY IS ON THE RAPID MOVEMENT (2 FLIGHTS PER PLANE PER DAY WITH 25,000 LBS PER LOAD) OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, WHICH IT IS UNDERSTOOD IS AVAILABLE IN NAIROBI (THE TEMPORARY BASE FOR THE HERCULES) UNTIL 30 APRIL WHEN THE HERCULES MUST RETURN TO CANADA. THIS IS A GODSEND AT A TIME WHEN MR B WALDRUM IN NAIROBI HAS WARNED US THAT THE INSURANCE ON THE UN IL76 AND IL 100 WILL MOST LIKELY BE CANCELLED FOR FLIGHTS TO KIGALI OR MAY HAVE TO SUPPORT SOMALIA. THE RAPID MOVEMENT, COMMENCING TOMORROW UNTIL 30 APRIL, OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES IS AN ABSOLUTE AND ESSENTIAL NECESSITY WHICH CANNOT BE DELAYED. THE MORAL IMPERATIVE TO HELP AND THE REPUTATION OF UNAMIR AND THE UN DEPENDS UPON THE TIMELY ARRIVAL OF ASSISTANCE.

5. MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. A MEETING WAS HELD YESTERDAY IN GITARAMA WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND TWO MINISTERS. THE MEETING WAS HELD TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO EVACUATE REFUGEES FROM EITHER SIDE TO SAFE AREAS OF THEIR CHOICE AND TO OBTAINING APPROVAL FROM THE RGF FOR THE DESIGNATION OF THE AIRPORT IN KIGALI AS NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL GROUND UNDER THE SOLE CONTROL AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE FORMALIZATION OF UNAMIR MONITORED SAFE PASSAGE OF REFUGEES. IN ADDITION THE RGF SEEM TO HAVE MELLOWED ON THE CONCEPT OF A UN CONTROLLED AND SECURED AIRPORT.

6. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED THE TACTICAL SITUATION OF THE WAR. THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE CONCERNED OR DISMAYED WITH THE HORRENDOUS ETHNIC KILLINGS. THEY STATE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE MILITIAS. THE LOCAL ROADBLOCKS ARE THERE BECAUSE THE LOCAL PEOPLE WANT PROTECTION AGAINST THE RPF. THEIR CONCERNS WERE OVER MATTERS SUCH AS HOW TO ORGANIZE A STATE FUNERAL FOR THE LATE PRESIDENT. ALL OF THIS IN A NATION WHICH HAS LOST AS MANY AS 100,000 KILLED AND 1 1/2 MILLION DISPLACED IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS AND IS ON THE VERGE OF MILITARY COLLAPSE. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION. THIS MAY

L0001748

- 3 -

BE DUE TO THE INCREDIBLY POOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN KIGALI AND GITARAMA. ALL WRITTEN MATERIAL MUST BE DELIVERED BY HAND. NO DATA PASSAGE CAPABILITY EXISTS. THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE RGF DELEGATION NOT ARRIVING IN GOMA FOR THEIR UN ORGANIZED FLIGHT TO ARSHA. EVEN THOUGH THE ARMY HQ STATED THE DELEGATION WAS IN GOMA. WE ARE LOOKING AT A WAY OF HELPING THEM WITH THEIR COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO GET MORE TIMELY ANSWERS TO THE CEASEFIRE AND OTHER RELATED AND HUMANITARIAN MATTERS.

7. MEETING WITH MGEN KAGAME. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FC TRAVELLED TO MULINDI BY ROAD TO MEET MGEN KAGAME AT HIS MAIN HEADQUARTERS. FROM APPROXIMATELY 1 KM NORTH OF KIGALI THE MAIN ROAD WAS TOTALLY UNDER RPF CONTROL. AT BYUMBA, THE CITY WAS DESERTED OF PEOPLE AND THE RGF. EVIDENCE OF A LARGE SCALE BATTLE WAS EVIDENT AND RPF CONTROL SEEMED COMPLETE.

8. AT MULINDI, THE FC FOUND A COMFORTABLE, COMPETENT, RELAXED AND CONFIDENT STAFF AT WORK IMPLEMENTING AN OPERATIONAL PLAN WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED WELL IN ADVANCE.

9. IN CONVERSATION WITH MGEN KAGAME, HE EXPLAINED HIS OPERATIONAL PLAN TO THE FC. THE RPF ATTACK IN THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE WAR IN THE NORTH WEST NEAR RUHENGARI WAS A FEINT TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF BYUMBA OR KIGALI. THE MAIN EFFORT WAS ON THE WEST FLANK OF BYUMBA AND IN THE EXTREME EAST AT GABIRO AND THE AKAGERA HIGHWAY. AT BYUMBA, THE RPF ENVELOPED THE RGF POCKET OF 7 BATTALIONS AND CONTINUED TO CUT THE KIGALI-RUHENGARI ROAD AT BASE AND PROCEED UPON THE ROUTE TO KIGALI TO OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR REINFORCED BATTALION AT THE CND. THE BYUMBA POCKET WAS HARASSED WITH SURGICAL ARTILLERY AND MORTAR STRIKES DURING THE DAY AND INFILTRATED WITH SMALL GROUPS FOR HARRASSMENT, RAIDS AND AMBUSHES AT NIGHT. THIS TACTIC EXHAUSTED AND DEMORALIZED THE RGF BEFORE THE FINAL ASSAULT WHICH LED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF A COUPLE OF BATTALIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL IN REASONABLE ORDER OF THE OTHER BATTALIONS. THEY HAVE BEEN SPOTTED SINCE WEST OF KIGALI AND RPF FORCES ARE ENGAGING IN ORDER TO REDUCE THEM AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE RGF LEFT LOTS OF WEAPONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENTS BEHIND WHICH THE RPF ARE USING. SLIGHTLY TO THE WEST OF THIS LINE THE RPF ADVANCED TO CUT THE KIGALI-RUHENGARI HIGHWAY AND INFILTRATE TO THE WEST OF KIGALI. IN THE EXTREME EAST AN RPF COLUMN ADVANCED AND TOOK NGARAMA AND THEN GABIRO THUS EFFECTIVELY CUTTING THE COUNTRY OFF FROM UGANDA. THE ADVANCE THEN PROCEEDED SOUTH TO RAWAGAMA WHICH WAS SECURED. THIS EFFECTIVELY CUT THE MAIN RWANDA/TANZANIA ROAD. THEN THE RPF FORCE SPLIT WITH ONE COLUMN ADVANCING ON KIGALI FROM THE EAST AND THE OTHER PROCEEDING SOUTH TO KIBUNGO WHICH IS NOT YET SECURED. MGEN KAGAME STATED KIGALI WAS NEVER HIS MAIN OBJECTIVE. BECAUSE OF ITS VALUE TO THE GOVERNMENT AS A PRESTIGE SYMBOL THE ROLE OF THE CND BATTALION AND INFILTRATED REINFORCEMENTS WAS TO TIE DOWN AS MANY RGF TROOPS AND REINFORCEMENTS AS POSSIBLE WHILE THE BYUMBA AND RAWAGAMA CAMPAIGNS WERE COMPLETED. THE RPF DID NOT WANT TO BECOME EMBROILED IN A FIBUA BATTLE THAT WOULD DRAIN THEIR PRECIOUS HUMAN RESOURCES UNTIL THE OUTER BATTLE HAD BEEN DECIDED.

L0001749

- 4 -

INSTEAD THEY CONCENTRATED ON SPLITTING THE CITY INTO PIECES AND OCCUPYING THE DOMINATING FEATURES AROUND THE CITY (MT KIGALI, MT RIBERO, MT KASSANA ETC). AT PRESENT MGEN KAGAME HINTED (AND TONIGHT CONFIRMED) THAT IT WAS NOW TIME TO SORT OUT KIGALI. THE WESTERN FORCE WILL PREVENT REINFORCEMENT FROM RUHENGARI. THE EASTERN FORCE WILL ADVANCE ON KIBUNGO AND TAKE THE EASTERN PART. THE CENTRAL FORCE WILL TAKE KIGALI. HIS FUTURE OBJECTIVES THEN ARE NOT TOTALLY CLEAR. HE HINTED AT RUHENGARI AND GISSENYI.

10. THE SUMMARY OF THIS CONVERSATION IS THAT MGEN KAGAME DOES NOT SEEM QUITE ORIENTED TO ENTER INTO A CEASEFIRE AT THIS TIME. HIS FORCE IS WINNING THE TACTICAL WAR AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT AS LONG AS IT IS WINNING. IN ADDITION, THIS CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED OPERATION WHICH HAS GIVEN THE RPF THE NORTH AND EAST OF THE COUNTRY SO FAR. IT IS STILL A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE CAN CONSOLIDATE ALL THESE HOLDINGS.

11. IN LATER CONVERSATIONS LAST NIGHT WITH PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU, HE REAFFIRMED THE RPF POSITION REGARDING ARUSHA TALKS. ESSENTIALLY, THEY WERE ATTENDING BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THEY WOULD TELL THEIR STORY AND LEAVE. THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE INTERNAL COMMUNITY HAS NOT STATED CLEARLY ITS DISGUST WITH THE DECAPITATION OF ALL THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE TOTAL SURVIVAL OF THE MRND AND ITS LEADERS. THEY REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE MILITIAS ARE LINKED WITH THE RGF AUTHORITIES.

12. TODAY AT 1700 HOURS MGEN KAGAME FORWARDED A NOTE TO THE FC WARNING UNAMIR PERSONNEL TO REMAIN IN THEIR CAMPS AS THE BATTLE FOR KIGALI WOULD COMMENCE TONIGHT OR TOMORROW. GIVEN THEIR RECENT VICTORIES AND HIGH MORALE IT IS LIKELY KIGALI MAY FALL OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

13. BEHIND GOVERNMENT LINES, A MAJOR CONCERN TO UNAMIR IS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE, BELLIGERENCE AND ACTIONS OF THE MILITIAS, PARTICULARLY THE INTERHAMWE. THESE MILITIAS CONTINUE TO MAN ROADBLOCKS AND CONDUCT ETHNIC CLEANSING. OFTEN THEY ARE DRUNK OR DRUGGED. MGEN KAGAME STATED THAT IN ONE BATTLE THEY WERE SLAUGHTERED IN A FANATICAL BUT HOPELESS ATTACK. THESE GROUPS REPRESENT THE SINGLE GREATEST THREAT TO UNAMIR AND ITS HUMANITARIAN AND RESCUE MISSIONS. THEY HAVE KILLED THOUSANDS OF RWANDESE (BOTH TUTSIS AND HUTUS), EXPATRIATES AND ON TWO OCCASIONS THEY HAVE ATTACKED UN VEHICLES. DEFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WILL ENSURE THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS, SHOULD THEY ATTACK UN INSTALLATIONS, PERSONNEL OR CONVOYS, WILL BE WARNED AND IF NECESSARY DEADLY FORCE WILL BE USED IN SELF-DEFENCE. THE FC WILL CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE RGF TO GET THE MILITIAS UNDER CONTROL. MGEN KAGAME STATED THE RPF WILL SORT OUT THE MILITIAS IN THEIR OWN WAY.

14. IN CONCLUSION, THE NEXT 48-72 HOURS SHOULD SEE THE CLIMAX OF THE BATTLE FOR KIGALI AND MOPPING UP IN THE NORTH AND EAST OF THE COUNTRY. THE RGF HAS LOST THE INITIATIVE AND IS FOCUSED ON LOCAL TACTICAL BATTLES AND IS NEGLECTING THE

L0001750

- 5 -

GREATER OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF THIS CAMPAIGN. THEY ARE PUSHING REINFORCEMENTS INTO KIGALI WHERE THE RPF HAVE SEIZED THE MAJOR TERRAIN FEATURES AND DEVELOPED EXTENSIVE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. RPF ATTEMPTS TO DISLODGE THE RPF WILL RESULT IN HEAVY CASUALTIES AND BREAK THE BACK OF THEIR ARMY, WHILE THE RPF ENCIRCLES THEM AND CONTINUES TO MAKE GAINS IN SEIZING GROUND IN RWANDA. UNAMIR WILL ADOPT A FULL STAND TO DEFENSIVE POSTURE WITHIN ITS CAMPS. DEFENSIVE WORKS ARE ADVANCING AND WILL IMPROVE WITH THE ARRIVAL OF DEFENSIVE STORES TOMORROW. THE UNAMIR AIM OF THIS PHASE OF THE WAR WILL BE SELF-PROTECTION AND ARMED ESCORTS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.


15. REGARDS.

77.8 Communiqué du FPR du 23 avril 1994



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

CNR 267 P2/4



CASE NO. TEL-98-41-T
EXHIBIT NO. DFT 192
DATE ADMITTED 22-11-2005
TENDERED BY DEFENCE
NAME OF WITNESS Booh Booh

New York, 23 May 1994

PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to restate that it does not recognize the so called interim government in Rwanda and it has nothing to do with a bunch of murderers that have turned our entire country into a graveyard.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front has welcomed and received Iqbal Riza, special envoy of the UN Secretary General at its headquarters in Mulindi, Northern Rwanda. To facilitate his mission, the Rwandese Patriotic Front will restrain from combat operations wherever he will be, as it has been the practice for other dignitaries who have visited our country during this crisis. These measures should not be interpreted to mean a ceasefire.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front requests UNAMIR to take precautions to ensure that the presence of the UN personnel in Rwanda government forces/positions is not used as a cover by the army to fire at our positions. In such a case the Rwandese Patriotic Front will not hesitate to return fire.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front was informed by the United Nations that the purpose of Mr. Iqbal Riza's visit was to discuss military modalities for the deployment of expanded UNAMIR. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is offended by Mr. Riza's intentions to discuss political matters with the so-called interim government in Gitarama. Recalling that the UN Security Council allowed the criminal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Rwanda to participate in voting for the resolution 918 on 16 May 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Front interprets the continued dealings with the so-called interim government by UN personnel as implicit recognition of that government.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front further requests the Secretary General to totally withdraw his Special Representative, Mr. Jacques Roger Booh Booh from the Rwanda UN Mission before any implementation of Security Council resolution 918/1994.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front is now in control of both the Airport and the Kanombe military base and as it has stated before it will facilitate the use of the airport by the UN for humanitarian purposes.



-2-

The Rwandese Patriotic Front will continue with its noble task of saving innocent lives and will continue to pursue its military operations in order to render the so-called interim government and its military machinery incapable of ever committing genocide against the Rwandese people again.



Claude Dusaidi
Director of External Relations and,
RPF Representative at the UN



77.9 Le refus des interventions humanitaires par le FPR

77.9.1 Extrait de Human Rights Watch/Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, *Aucun témoin ne doit survivre. Le génocide au Rwanda*, Karthala, Paris, 1999, p. 816.

« Les représentants de Human Right Watch et de la FIDH, qui recevaient des fréquents appels téléphoniques de Tutsi qui se cachaient au Rwanda et demandaient de l'aide, furent choqués par l'opposition du FPR à l'envoi d'une nouvelle force des Nations Unies et le prièrent de reconsidérer sa position. Le 2 mai, Éric Gillet de la FIDH écrivit au colonel Kanyarengwe :

“Nous comprenons bien les raisons que le FPR aurait à ne pas accepter une force d'interposition. Nous ne pouvons en revanche pas comprendre les raisons légitimes que le FPR pourrait invoquer pour s'opposer à toute solution qui, sans entraver les opérations militaires en cours, permettrait en outre d'apporter les secours nécessaires à la population civile.”

Les diplomates du Conseil de Sécurité exercèrent également des pressions sur le FPR, mais sans grand succès. Le 11 mai, Radio *Muhabura*, la voix du FPR, continuait d'affirmer que “ le génocide (était) déjà terminé”. Le 18 mai, alors que le Conseil de Sécurité avait autorisé la veille, l'envoi d'une seconde force de maintien de la paix, Denis Polisi, Vice-Président du FPR se plaignit de la lenteur avec laquelle l'opération allait être mise en place. Il déclara: “Il y a encore des gens qui souffrent tous les jours. Des gens meurent et nous pensons qu'un mois ou deux est un délai trop long...”. Il faisait expressément référence à l'aide humanitaire et avertissait “que s'ils faisaient autre chose, ils seraient considérés comme une force ennemie”. Le FPR continua jusqu'à la fin mois de mai à exiger que la force de maintien de la paix se limite strictement à des tâches d'assistance humanitaire, plutôt qu'elle entreprenne des efforts plus actifs pour protéger les Tutsi. Il insista également pour qu'elle soit dotée de moins de soldats que les 5500 prévus dans la résolution adoptée le 17 mai par le Conseil de Sécurité. »

77.9.2 Entretien entre le général Roméo Dallaire et Paul Kagame, Mulindi, le 19 avril 1994²

« Je lui ai donc rapporté ce qui se passait au sujet de la réduction des effectifs, du cessez-le-feu, de la neutralité de l'aéroport et du transfert des civils. Il m'a répété qu'il ne tolérerait pas que la MINUAR mène une action qui pourrait être interprétée comme une intervention. Je lui ai répondu que non seulement toute intervention était exclue de mon mandat, mais qu'en plus on m'avait privé de toute possibilité d'opération offensive. J'ai ajouté qu'en retour je ne tolérerais aucune action militaire, ni de ses troupes ni de l'AGR, qui menacerait les Rwandais sous ma protection. Il m'a promis d'entreprendre toutes les préparations nécessaires afin que les transferts puissent commencer dès que possible. Il a ajouté qu'il avait retardé son offensive contre Kigali justement pour permettre aux civils de quitter la ville avant la bataille. Il avait déjà repéré les sites où pourraient se rendre les réfugiés et il m'a demandé mon aide

² Roméo Dallaire, *J'ai serré la main du diable*, Libre Expression, Montréal, 2004, p. 412-413.

pour y faire parvenir l'aide humanitaire. Je lui ai répondu que je réfléchirais à sa requête seulement si j'avais la certitude que cette aide n'aboutirait pas dans les véhicules ou dans l'estomac de ses troupes. Il m'a dit qu'il laisserait nos états-majors mutuels trouver une solution, ce qui ne m'a pas rassuré.

Puis nous avons commencé à discuter de la situation de la bataille elle-même, et j'ai étendu ma carte militaire entre lui et moi sur le sol.

Il était évident que Kagame avait bloqué, sans grand effort, un certain nombre de bataillons de l'AGR qui défendaient le cœur de la terre hutue, Ruhengeri. Cela lui permettait, une fois prise la ville de Byumba et la route principale se dirigeant vers l'est, de se rendre vers le sud, jusqu'à la frontière de la Tanzanie et de boucler avec le fleuve. Il faisait aussi avancer son armée vers l'Ouest, juste en dessous de Kigali, sur l'axe principal qui menait à la capitale. Il était clair que Kigali était encerclée et devait s'attendre à une épreuve de force. Après avoir insinué une possible consolidation de son armée le long du fleuve, dans une direction nord-sud, il a terminé la discussion de ses plans militaires de façon brutale et a détourné la conversation sur les négociations d'Arusha, qui devaient commencer le matin suivant. Il ne s'y était pas rendu, car il soutenait que la solution revenait aux politiciens. Pessimiste quant à l'issue potentielle de la réunion, il pensait qu'au départ les ententes d'Arusha - que j'avais le mandat d'appuyer - servaient exclusivement « à sauver la vie de militaires et non point celle de civils ». Une fois notre session de travail terminée, il m'a invité à dormir chez lui, car retourner à Kigali la nuit tombée était trop dangereux. Nous nous sommes serré la main avec force et nous nous sommes souhaité les meilleures choses possibles. Puis, on m'a escorté pour sortir de son bureau.

Le lendemain, à Arusha, les diplomates feraient leur numéro, mais le sort en était jeté : nous nous dirigeons à la fois de façon méthodique et désordonnée vers une bataille importante pour la ville de Kigali. Au cours de notre entretien, j'ai demandé à Kagame pourquoi il ne sautait pas directement à la gorge de ses ennemis à Kigali. Il a complètement ignoré les implications allant de pair avec ma question. Il savait très bien que chaque jour de bataille dans la périphérie de Kigali entraînait la mort des Tutsi qui se trouvaient derrière les lignes de l'AGR. »