

## **Box 12: Meeting between Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh and Col. Théoneste Bagosora during the night of 6-7 April**

In his deposition of 21 November 2005 for the ICTR, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh reconstitutes his meeting with Bagosora as follows:

“A.: [...] I must confess that there and then, I did not ask myself the question as to why he was the one who came, given that the army had generals, the army had a chief of staff, the army had the minister of Defense. But it was later on that I was told that the chief of staff had died in the plane that he had died alongside the president. I was also told that the minister of defense was on mission in Cameroon. Therefore, that was the only question I asked myself, but without giving much importance to it. [...]

Q. [...] Can you tell us what happened from that moment on?

A. Well, Colonel Bagosora told me -- well, I was assisted by two of my aids with whom I was preparing my trip to Kibuye. He told me that the president's plane had just had an accident and that the president had died. I do not know whether he also mentioned the death of the Burundian president. In any case, I immediately presented, or conveyed my condolences to him before continuing. He also told me that the soldiers had met and had chosen a colonel. I remember well. I remember he said a colonel from Butare, something to that effect. I did not understand very much. Was the colonel coming from Butare? Was he on duty in Butare? Well, the fact remains that I heard something along those lines, and I did not attach much importance to it.

He said something to the effect that they had chosen a leader, and that their aim was to maintain law and order, to reassure the population, while UNAMIR, alongside the politicians, will assume the responsibility of putting in place, or enforcing the peace agreement. So I told him that this means that you have carried out a coup d'état. He told me, “No.” He answered no. He told me that they have not carried out a coup d'état. That was not within their plan, but that it is necessary to have people who reassure the population. I told him I was sorry, that UNAMIR did not come to Rwanda in that frame of mind, that we had come to work with civilians and politicians, and that the setting up of a committee, as he told me, was not of importance to us.

I was supported by General Dallaire, who said that, in a democratic country, it is civilians who command; soldiers work under the orders of civilians. So the discussion was along those lines, namely, that we were not interested in their business, in their committee. I told him that it was necessary for them to see the prime minister because, to my mind, whether reference was made to the new or old constitution or the Arusha Peace Accords was provided in both constitutions.

I also told him that, to my mind, it was necessary that everyone be contacted. I mentioned the MRND, because the president had to be chosen from among members of the MRND party. The Peace Accord had even provided for such a situation in the event the president disappeared. So that is what I said. To my mind, I thought that even the RPF had to be involved in the preparation, in the coping with this difficult situation. The colonel did not exclude all the other contacts, but he excluded the possibility of contacting Mrs. Agathe. It is clear. He said that Mrs. Agathe was a woman who had been rejected by her own government, her people, the armed forces. In fact, that was the kind of thing he told me, and he added that the army did not want of Mrs. Agathe.”