Annexe 134 : Warnings of Genocide to UNAMIR, notes récapitulatives de l’ONU
(Organisation des Nations unies) du 20 Novembre 1995

UNITED NATIONS
MISSION POUR L’ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR, KIGALI

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 20 November 1995
NO.: MIR 796
NO. OF PAGES: 7
SUBJECT: Warnings of Genocide to UNAMIR

1. During the recent Genocide Conference, Rwandan officials again took up the issue that warnings by RPF that genocide was long planned by the former Government were either suppressed (by former SRSG Booh-Booh) or went unheeded (UNHQ after reports from General Dallaire). The accusations are made towards UN, UNAMIR and the major powers notably Belgium.

2. I appointed a committee consisting of Col. Fletcher, Mr. Tikoca who was Chief Military Observer and present in Rwanda throughout the period and Isel Rivero who was handling Rwanda from UNHQ at the time. The conclusions of the Committee are attached. They confirm the view that there was no information or indication of planned genocide. There were, of course, warnings of armed clashes, violence and killings on an ethnic basis.

3. The note along with relevant telegrams is sent to you for background information.

Best Regards,

[Signature]

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From: Col W J Fletcher
DCOS (Sp) Ext 1109
To: SA to SRSG
Info: MA/FC
File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-27
Date: 9 Nov 95
Subject: INQUIRY INTO THE REPORTED ESCALATION OF ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA DURING JAN TO MAR 94.

Reference:
A. SRSG Meeting 7 Nov 95
B. UNAMIR Weekly SITREP 9 dated 14 December 1993
C. Code Cable MIR 59 dated 6 January 1994
D. Code Cable MIR 267 dated 3 February 1994
E. Code Cable MIR 404 dated 23 February 1994
F. Code Cable MIR 406 dated 24 February 1994

1. I have reviewed the Code Cables sent by BGen Dallaire to UNNY during the subject timeframe and can find no reference to "possible genocide". I should note, however, from my understanding the term "genocide" was not used until after the events of April 94.

2. That said, the following points are noted:
   a. In Dec 94, at reference B, comment was made in the effect that the militant activity to destabilize the implementation of the Arusha Accords had slowed down significantly.
   b. At reference C, BGen Dallaire reported in response to a query on atrocities committed in Nov 93 that "We have as yet no definite proof on who did these acts but the manner in which they were conducted in their execution, in their cover-up, and in their political motives leads us to firmly believe that the perpetrators of these evil deeds were well organized, well informed, well motivated and prepared to conduct pre-meditated murder. We have no reason to believe that such occurrences could not and will not be repeated again in any part of this country where arms are prolific and political and ethnic tensions are prevalent."
   c. Reference D included an assessment of the security situation in Rwanda in which BGen Dallaire expressed concern that "Should the present Kagame defensive
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Concentration posture of UNAMIR be maintained, the security situation will
deteriorate even further. We can expect more frequent and more violent
demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and political groups, more
assassinations and quite possibly outright attacks on UNAMIR installations and
personnel, as was done on the home of the SRSG." He went on to further state that
the situation demanded determined and selective deterrent operations on military targets
with the cooperation of the RGF, even if reluctant and even if they had to be pushed
into cooperation. He expressed concern with the possibility of losing the initiative to
influence the security situation and thereby becoming unable to fulfill the existing
mandate.

d. At reference E, the SRSG in advising events following the assassinations of the
Minister of Public Works and the President of the CDR stated that UNAMIR was
"especially keen to avert any incident or misunderstanding that could spark and/or
degenerate into inter-ethnic violence or engage the opposing Government and PPR
forces."

e. At reference F, SRSG, in a follow-up to reference E, stated that in response to
reports of ethnically motivated violence in the capital and other areas he did not have
conclusive evidence that the events of 22 and 23 February were ethnically motivated
or provoked ethnic consequences. He further stated that "We are following this aspect
with particular attention because of the potentially explosive impact that the resurgence
of Hutu/Tutsi ethnic violence could have not only on the Rwandan situation but also
in neighbouring Burundi."

3. That is the extent of what I have gleaned from the copies of correspondence held in the
FC Office. Interestingly enough, the STREPS for March 1994 all indicate that the situation
was calm, although incidents were continually reported throughout the country by the MILODs
and UNICIPOL. I understand that there are other documents in which Gen Dallaire
requested permission to do cordon and search operations, but that does not imply any warning
of ethnic cleansing on the scale which came to pass. I believe that your knowledge of the
events of early 1994 can quite likely fill the gaps, if there are any, and I would be most willing
to assist you if need be to sift through files.
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RwandA

Chronology

5 October 1993  UN Security Council adopted resolution 872 establishing UNAMIR.

21 October 1993  Burundi coup d'état by Tutsi military elite.

1 November 1993  SRSG appointed.

Massacres and other hostilities began to occur in the north of the country, specially in the area of Buhengeri where 40 people died.

3 December 1993  SRSG held press conference to appeal to Rwandese to refrain from violence.

10 December 1993  SRSG/FC recommit both parties; Declaration in support of Arusha in Kinshasa is issued.

However, reports received by UNAMIR in early December 1993 indicated that suspicious movements by armed militias had been noticed.

The media war proceeded relentless; racist and inflammatory propaganda was consistently broadcast by Radio Mille Collines urging the Hutu to take up to the Tutsi.

Rifts within political parties also become apparent: Parti Liberal and Movement Democratique Rwandais (MDR).

Diplomatic Missions in Kigali were requested to get actively involved in expediting a smooth transition towards the installation of the EBTG. This process continued till the very end.

20 December 1993  Commitment of Kigali weapons secure area operations in Kigali.

(This was essential to have the RPF move into CNN complex in Kigali)
8 January 1994
Road blocks - militia prevent access to Parliament - MOB.

Security Council decides to deploy II phase forces because of security considerations (Ghana Battalion to OIF).

1 January 1994
Informant provided information of plans by Interahamwe militia to disrupt process and assassinate moderates. FC instructed by us to approach President and inform diplomatic community.

9 January 1994
SG called SRSU from Geneva indicating concern on delays.

10 January 1994
Assassination attempt against former Liberal Party Minister Faustin Mugenzi.

1 January 1994
FC sought guidance on options regarding political-military direction. We recommended speedy deployment of second battalion.

1-28 January 1994
Belgian defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister visited UNAMIR.

2 January 1994
French DC-8 landed with 90 boxes of 80 mm mortar bombs. UNAMIR protests.

4 January 1994
A house was bombed in Nyamirambo District, Kigali. Member of Interahamwe arrested - riots.

6-27 January 1994
Two grenade explosions at CND complex, road blocks.

6 February 1994
US Secretary of State Douglas Bennett visited UNAMIR and UNMIR.

February 1994
SRSU/FC requested authorization for the commencement of deterrent operations aimed at the recovery of illegal weapons.

We replied that UNAMIR did not have a mandate to carry out operations - UNAMIR could monitor GPF/Gendarmerie.
3 February 1994
FC reported that Minister of Defence, Army Chief of Staff and Minister of Interior were in agreement with a weapons recovery operations, and stated so publicly. FC requested guidance on his plan.

We replied in the same context of mandate while providing a bit more cautionary flexibility.

15 February 1994
SRSG/FC insisted on a recovery of illegal weapons operations and sought clarifications of mandate.

21 February 1994
Assassination of Minister of Public Works (SD).

23 February 1994
Assassination of the Secretary-General of the CDR.

24 February 1994
UNAMIR armed escort attacked with grenades.

25 February 1994
UK Ambassador to Uganda visits Kigali and UNAMIR.

SG calls President Habyarimana.
President warns SRSG that his life is at risk. SRSG requests review of security arrangements.

27 February 1994
FC requests reinforcement of Kigali weapons secure area and provides his plan.

1 March 1994
SRSG meets with the RPF in Mulindi.

This is the crucial meeting where the SRSG appeared to be partial by recommending the President's formula for candidates. The SRG indicated that the RPF was not yielding and that the RPF "appeared to be seriously considering the war option".

6-7 March 1994
Killings in Burundi resume.

10 March 1994
Manifesto of shipment arrival containing heavy weapons for RPF discovered by UNAMIR.

(To be continued??)